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BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
In a recent case,73 a will before the Court of Appoals for
construction provided for a trust for the lives of the sister and
cousin of the testatrix, the corpus to go to her nephew on the
termination of the trust, but in the eveht the nephew predeceased
the sister and the cousin the corpus was to go to charity. The
nephew outlived the cousin but predeceased the sister. The court,
bolstering its opinion with the rules mentioned above, construed
the will literally holding that the nephew's interest vested inde-
feasibly on his surviving the cousin. The remainder passed to his
estate, therefore, and the gift to the charity was defeated.
Judge Van Voorhis, the sole dissenter, maintained that the
intent of the testatrix that the nephew survive the termination of
the trust in order to take was manifest, and that in view of this
intent the rules of construction should not be applied.
Judicial Correction of Invalid Trust Provisions
It is the established rule in this state that invalid portions
of a will may be excised by the court so that the remaining provi-
sions may be preserved and the intent of the testator carried out
as far as possible. 4 The proper application of this rule was the
issue before the Court of Appeals in In re Fischer's Will. 75
In this case the testator had provided for the creation of a
trust, the income to be paid to his wife for her life and upon her
death the principal to become a part of his residuary estate. A
further provision set up a trust of the residuary estate, which
was to be charged with an annuity to be paid to the testator's
mother for her life, the balance to be held until his grandson be-
came twenty-one, or if he should die before reaching that age until
the grandnephew of the testator should die or reach twenty-one.
On the termination of the trust the corpus was to be distributed
to residuary legatees named in the will. The Surrogate ruled that
the trust set up for the widow violated the rule against perpetui-
ties since the corpus might not be alienable until the testator's
wife, grandson and grandnephew had died. In order to effectuate
the intent of the testator as far as possible, the Surrogate pre-
served the trust for the widow by deleting the third measuring
life insofar as it applied to the corpus of the widow's trust. He
further determined that (since the remainder interests of the
residuary legatees were contingent and, therefore, not subject to
acceleration 7 ) the residue of the corpus of the widow's trust
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should pass as intestate property upon the termination of the two
measuring lives.
The Appellate Division modified the decision of the Surro-
gate, ruling that since the will made no provision for the payment
of the income during the lives of the grandson and grandnephew,
and since the income could not be accumulated (some of the residu-
ary legatees being adults) ,77 both of the latter measuring lives
should be excised and the corpus of the widow's trust should pass
to the residuary legatees at her death.
The Court of Appeals reversed and reinstated the decision of
the Surrogate. Finding that the testator had provided for a
delay in the distribution of the corpus of the widow's trust until
his grandson had reached twenty-one to assure an adequate prin-
cipal in the residuary trust to pay the annuity, the court ruled
that the trust was, therefore, an active one. The fact that the
secondary purpose of accumulating the excess income was illegal
could not destroy the validity of a trust having this valid primary
objective. The court further agreed with the determination of
the Surrogate that the gifts to the residuary legatees could not
be accelerated inasmuch as they were based on survivorship and,
therefore, contingent.7 8 The finding that the corpus of the widow's
trust-passed as intestate property necessarily followed.
Charitable Trusts
It is an established principle that where a testator has ap-
parently sought to leave money for a charitable purpose, a liberal
construction is to be given to the terms of the will in order to
uphold it and validate the bequest.79
In the case of In re Potter's Will,80 testator established a
trust for the benefit of the "education of the children of the
poor" and "for the education of the children of the poor who shall
be educated in the academy'in the village of Huntington." 81 The
academy was closed in 1858 and the building was torn down.
The question before the court was whether the testator had
a general charitable intent to educate the children of the poor, or
whether he had a specific charitable intent which failed when the
77. See PRsoNAL PROPERTY LAW § 16, REAL PROPERTY LAW § 61.
78. See Matter of Crane, 164 N. Y. 71, 58 N. E. 47 (1901).
79. Cf. In Re Pattberg's Will, 282 App. Div. 770, 123 N.Y. S. 2d 564 (2d Dep't
1953), aff'd, 306 N.Y. 835, 118 N.E. 2d 903 (1954) ; Matter of Neher's Will, 279 N.Y.
370, 18 N.E. 2d 625 (1939).
80. 307 N.Y. 504, 121 N.E. 2d 522 (1954); See Williams v. Williams, 8 N.Y.
525 (1853) where the same trust provision was before the court.
81. 281 App. Div. 981, 120 N.Y. S. 2d 636 (2d Dep't 1953).
